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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
EVOLUTION OF THE RENDEZVOUS-MANEUVER PLAN 
FOR LUNAR-LANDING MISSIONS 
B y  James D. Alexander and Robert W. Becker 
Lyndon B . Johnson Space Center 
S U MMA RY 
In the nominal rendezvous planning for lunar landing mi ions, the ge era1 pro- 
gression was from the direct-ascent technique, through the multiple-impulse phasing- 
orbit technique (coelliptic sequence), to the short rendezvous technique. 
The major objective throughout the rendezvous-plan evolution was a standard 
terminal approach that was executable by use of the reaction control system, that was 
controllable manually, and that was relatively insensitive to powered-ascent dispersion. 
Such a terminal approach was characteristic of both the coelliptic sequence and the 
short  rendezvous techniques. 
The most significant factor in the simplification and standardization of the orig- 
inally complex lunar module abort and rescue plan was the incorporation of variable 
insertion targeting fo r  aborts from powered descent. Other significant developments 
that improved onboard capability and increased confidence and safety were the imple- 
mentation of the coelliptic- sequence logic and the very- high-f requency ranging in the 
command module. 
The development of the dispersion and trajectory analysis capability significantly 
influenced the development of both the nominal and contingency rendezvous planning. 
Planning disciplines significantly influenced were propellant budgets, mission rules, 
crew procedures, trajectory constraints, maneuver sequence, and ground and onboard 
program verification. A significant organizational factor was the eventual assignment 
to  the rendezvoys specialists of the responsibilities for the rendezvous dispersion pro- 
gram development and fo r  the rendezvous dispersion analysis. 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this report is to record significant developments in the evolution 
of the rendezvous-maneuver plan for the Apollo lunar landing missions and to offer some 
general recommendations for rendezvous planning for future programs. The development 
of the rendezvous plan involved direction, coordination, analyses, and inputs from 
disciplines and flight experience over several years. Moreover, it involved not only 
the nominal rendezvous situation but also the contingency rendezvous situations. The 
disciplines included the crew and onboard systems, navigation planning, ground sup- 
port, dispersion analysis, consumable analysis, and mission rules. Important flight 
experiences contributing to Apollo lunar- rendezvous operation planning included the 
Gemini rendezvous missions and the developmental Apollo rendezvous missions. 
In th i s  report, emphasis is placed on the significant technical developments that 
evolved in  the rendezvous-maneuver plan. Other significant developments, including 
organizational factors, also are identified. 
NOMINAL RENDEZVOUS-MANEUVER-PLAN EVOLUTION 
The nominal rendezvous-maneuver plan for the lunar-landing missions progressed 
through the following basic techniques. 
1. Direct ascent 
2. Phasing (or parking) orbit, which ultimately evolved into the four-impulse 
coelliptic sequence 
3. Short rendezvous 
These techniques will be discussed fully later, but an early understanding of their dif- 
ferences and similarities will clarify the evolution of the nominal rendezvous plan. 
Originally considered in  the early 1960's, the direct  ascent theoretically placed 
the lunar module (LM), at powered-ascent cut-off (insertion), on a trajectory that 
would intercept the command and service module (CSM). This technique had the fol- 
lowing major disadvantages. 
1. The incremental velocity (AV) requirements during the final approach were 
beyond the capability of reaction control systems. 
2. The final approach (direction and relative velocity) varied as a function of the 
lift-off time within the normal launch window. Furthermore, powered-ascent disper- 
sions significantly increased the complexity of crew procedures and techniques during 
final approach. 
3. Because an intercept trajectory w a s  targeted at insertion, the insertion tar- 
gets varied with lift-off time. Therefore, the  launch window was undesirably sensitive 
to unsafe perigee occurrences. 
The first two major disadvantages of the direct-ascent technique were overcome 
by the incorporation of two nominal intermediate maneuvers before the final intercept 
transfers (the terminal phase). The intermediate maneuver not only regulated the 
ascent so that the final approach involved relatively low, manually controllable ra tes  
within the reaction control system (RCS) capability, but also provided a capability to 
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economi'cally absorb (before terminal phase) powered-ascent dispersion and, there- 
fore, afforded a high probability of maintaining the standard approach. The new tech- 
nique was the four-impulse coelliptic sequence for which planning began in  late 1964. 
The coelliptic sequence also eventually involved standard insertion targeting; there- 




The short rendezvous technique was developed beginning in late 1969, following 
flown. This new technique was a compromise between the first two techniques. The 
short rendezvous technique involved neither a direct-ascent nor a phasing-orbit coel- 
liptic sequence but incorporated important characteristics of both. It afforded the fast 
rendezvous time that was characteristic of the direct ascent yet retained the high prob- 
ability of achieving the standard terminal approach that was  characteristic of the 
phasing-orbit coelliptic sequence. Although the insertion orbit w a s  not an intercept 
trajectory, an intercept trajectory was established by use of the first in-orbit nominal 
maneuver (about one- third revolution) after insertion. A nominally zero tweak maneu- 
ver  scheduled a few minutes after insertion and used in combination with the intercept- 
transfer maneuver served as a two-impulse (Lambert) dispersion-absorption capability. 
Therefore, compared with the coelliptic sequence (which essentially involved Hohmann 
dispersions could be absorbed conveniently and economically for the short rendezvous. 
For larger  dispersions o r  for  certain system failures, a "bailout" (abort) to the co- 
elliptic sequence was available to allow the standard final intercept conditions. Be- 
cause of this resource and because of the confidence derived from the Apollo ll and 
12 missions, the short rendezvous was incorporated as the primary rendezvous tech- 
nique beginning with the Apollo 14 mission. 
the first lunar-landing mission in which the four-impulse coelliptic sequence was 
I t ransfers  as the means of dispersion absorption) only relatively small powered-ascent 
' 
I 
The third basic technique has been referred to by three different names: early, 
short, and direct. Although the te rm lldirectl l  became the most official name, in this 
report, the technique is referred to as the short rendezvous to avoid confusion between 
the t e rms  "direct-ascent rendezvous" and "direct rendezvous. '' Furthermore, the 
te rm designating the number of impulses for a particular rendezvous sequence (for 
example, four-impulse coelliptic sequence) includes the nominal maneuvers after LM 
insertion. The terminal phase (intercept transfer initiation and braking) for this 
impulse-numbering method is assumed to have only two impulses. 
The t e r m  "concentric sequence" was used in the early nominal planning because 
the target orbit  was always essentially circular. However, when the abort and rescue 
planning introduced relatively elliptical target orbits, the te rm "coelliptic sequence" 
was adopted to emphasize that the constant differential height condition could also be 
essentially established fo r  elliptical orbits. 
Rendezvous planning fo r  certain earth-orbit programs, such as Gemini and 
Skylab, had used a maneuver-line logic for which the number of maneuvers (or im- 
pulses) and the number of revolutions were of prime consideration. By use of this 
logic, the maneuvers and the revolutions could be treated as variables. However, as 
the nominal rendezvous plan for the lunar-landing missions evolved, these parameters 
were not treated as variables, mainly because of l imits on time and the concern for  
safe perilune. The maneuver-line logic could involve nonhorizontal maneuvers, which, 
in some cases, would lower perigee significantly. Although planning for lunar rendez- 
vous definitely was affected by previous earth-orbit rendezvous planning, a new type of 
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rendezvous planning was required. However, it might be of interest  to note how the 
number of impulses n and the number of revolutions m varied during the evolution 
of the nominal rendezvous. To indicate precisely its variation, the variable m, nor- 
mally expressed as an integer, is expressed in fractions. Hence, for the direct  ascent, 
n equaled 1, and m varied between 1/3 and 2,/3. During the evolution of the phasing- 
orbit coelliptic sequence, n increased from 2 to 3 and, finally, to 4, and m increased 
from approximately 1-1/3 to 1-2/3. Then, for the short rendezvous technique, n 
equaled 2 and m equaled approximately 2/3. Other prime planning factors for lunar 
rendezvous included certain characteristics of the terminal phase and the placing of 
maneuvers relative to the line of apsides. 
Generally, the major areas of nominal rendezvous development were launch win- 
dow, base orbits, maneuver sequence, and terminal phase. Each of these areas is 
discussed separately. In lunar-mission planning, the maneuver sequence and the ter- 
minal phase were the dominant considerations; in fact, developments in these two a reas  
essentially controlled the decisions for  the launch window and base orbits. For  this 
reason, the maneuver sequence and the terminal phase a r e  treated in greater  detail in 
the following sections. 
Launch Window 
The initial philosophy was that a nominal launch window of 4 to 5 minutes should 
exist. In other words, the nominal rendezvous sequence and time line should be appli- 
cable within this window. All direct-ascent technique planning and planning for the 
first part of the phasing-orbit technique were influenced by this requirement. However, 
certain proposed changes in the base orbits and in  the maneuver sequence (described in 
the two following sections) would have reduced such a nominal launch window to l e s s  
than 1 minute. It was  then decided that no realistic situations would require a nominal 
launch window of more than a few seconds. If the LM could not lift off so that the nom- 
inal sequence time line could be applied, either a CSM one-revolution delay o r  a con- 
tingency time line could be applied. In effect, the revised philosophy that was used 
during the remaining rendezvous- technique development meant that no specific nominal 
launch window existed. 
A significant factor in launch-window analysis was the development of the "rec- 
ommended lift-off time" computer program. The program eventually could determine 
the optimum lift-off time as a function of desired parameters  for either the four- 
impulse coelliptic sequence o r  the two-impulse short  rendezvous. 
Base Orbits 
The CSM lunar parking orbit. - The choice of altitude f o r  the CSM lunar parking 
orbit involved both nominal capabilities (initially including launch-window considera- 
tions) and powered-descent-abort phasing and ranging considerations. A nearly 
circular orbit was  chosen because of its rendezvous advantages, mainly monitoring- 
and-backup- technique simplification. The initial rendezvous planning was based on 
the assumption of a CSM parking-orbit altitude of 80 nautical miles circular.  Directly 
because of limited LM RCS propellant and indirectly because of limited ascent propul- 
sion system (APS) propellant, the CSM parking-orbit altitude was decreased to 
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60 nautical miles circular. Lowering this altitude decreased the nominal launch- 
window capability and was a factor in  the elimination of the 4- to 5-minute nominal 
launch window. The 60-nautical-mile orbit was incorporated into the planning after 
the basic four-impulse coelliptic sequence was developed, and it was thereafter main- 
tained as the nominal altitude. 
The LM insertion orbit. - Throughout the development of the nominal rendezvous 
plan, the LM insertion-orbit requirement alternated several t imes between a variable 
orbit and a constant orbit. A variable-insertion orbit is defined as one for  which the 
insertion targets are directly dependent on the CSM conditions (position, velocity, and 
so forth). A constant-insertion orbit is defined as one for  which the insertion targets 
remain essentially constant within certain limits regardless of the CSM condition. For 
the direct-ascent technique, the insertion orbit varied within the nominal launch win- 
dow and had whatever dimensions were required to establish, at insertion, an intercept 
trajectory with the CSM in the 80-nautical-mile orbit. The APS was thought capable of 
obtaining any such required orbit; the only constraint was maintaining a safe perilune. 
For the original phasing-orbit technique, a low constant-insertion orbit of ap- 
proximately 10  nautical miles circular was considered. For the original coelliptic 
plan, the insertion apolune varied as a function of lift-off time within the nominal launch 
window. The objective of this variation was to control final transfer initiation time. 
During this period of development, dispersion analyses showed that the targeted apo- 
lune of the insertion orbit (about one-half revolution after insertion) should be no lower 
than 30 nautical miles to ensure a safe orbit. The insertion altitude at perilune of 
60 000 feet (approximately 9.8 nautical miles) w a s  influenced by APS AV considera- 
tions. The decision was made to incorporate a constant-insertion orbit when the basic 
four-impulse coelliptic sequence was developed. The approximately 10- by 30-nautical- 
mile orbit was incorporated at this point and remained nominal throughout most of the 
development of the coelliptic-sequence plan. Near the end of the development of the 
coelliptic-sequence plan, the apolune altitude was increased to approximately 45 nau- 
tical miles, mainly to decrease the relative range at insertion. The final change to 
the coelliptic- sequence plan involved inserting the LM with a constant radial-velocity 
component to  shift apolune approximately 5 minutes nearer  the insertion point. The 
apolune altitude remained at approximately 45 nautical miles, but the perilune altitude 
decreased to approximately 9.2 nautical miles. 
The insertion orbit fo r  the short rendezvous technique was basically the same as 
f o r  the final coelliptic sequence, but the apolune altitude varied from approximately 
45 to 50 nautical miles as a function of the mission plan. The constant radial compo- 
nent at insertion was maintained, and the orbit was targeted to obtain a desired differ- 
ential height (Ah) at a specified time after insertion. Therefore, the final type of LM 
insertion orbit  could be considered a nearly constant orbit. 
Maneuver Sequence 
The development of maneuver sequence has been introduced previously but is 
discussed in  detail here. 
Direct-ascent technique. - The original concept for the ascent-to-rendezvous 
technique was the direct-ascent concept. The analysis for  the direct-ascent technique 
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began in the early 1960's, before hardware characteristics and realistic dispersion 
magnitudes were well defined. An inertial sketch and maneuver-sequence data that 
a r e  representative of the direct-ascent technique a r e  shown in figure 1. The basic 
characteristics of this technique were as follows. 
1. A variable powered ascent (that 
is, variable insertion targets) as a function 
of the lift-off time within the nominal launch 
window, so that the LM would be inserted 
on a trajectory intercepting the CSM 
CSMat80n mi 
2. A variable transfer angle 
(insertion- to-intercept) that varied from 
approximately 120" to 300" as a function 
of lift-off time, with AV optimization being 
the main objective 
3. Variable-time and variable- 
relative-position midcourse corrections 
that were to include any plane change 
I 
The obvious advantage of the direct- 
ascent technique was the relatively short  
duration from lift-off to rendezvous com- 
Time from pletion. However, as a result of experi- 
maneuver system problems were identified in the early de- 
velopment of the Apollo rendezvous tech- 
nique (early 1964) by the flight crew and 
the variable transfer angle and the cffect 
of predicted dispersions, the final approach 
varied considerably. This variable final 
approach involved complex crew-monitoring, 
more, because most of the rendezvous 
activities occurred on the far side of the 
moon, almost no ground support was available. However, during the la ter  phases of 
development, the requirement for ground support of the terminal phase was eliminated, 
primarily because of the development of excellent onboard guidance and navigation 
systems. Also involved was an undesirable sensitivity to unsafe perilune and cor-plex 
ascent monitoring techniques because of the variable (lift-off- time dependent) insertion 
targets. A technique was needed that would afford a standard final approach, ground 
support of the primary maneuvers (based on assumptions at that time), and constant 
insertion orbit condition. The direct-ascent technique lacked these characteristics, 
so planning turned to some type of phasing- o r  parking-drbit technique. 
Nominal ence in the Gemini Program, two major 
Insertion 
Terminal braking RCS 80180 flight-control personnel. Because of both 
alntercept trajectory targeted at insertion 
bApproximate operational braking total 
Figure 1. - Representative direct-ascent 
technique . backup, and braking techniques. F'urther- 
Multiple-impulse phasing-orbit technique. - The multiple-impulse phasing-orbit 
technique progressed through several develoPmental phases. Each phase increased the 
acceptability of the technique fo r  the required applic&ions. 
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Original phasing-orbit technique: For the original phasing-orbit technique, the 
LM was to be inserted into a standard insertion orbit at an 8- to 10-nautical-mile alti- 
tude with an apolune altitude of 1 0  to 20 nautical miles, regardless of the lift-off time 
within the nominal launch window. The standard insertion would both alleviate the un- 
safe perilune problem and simplify the crew monitoring techniques, as compared with 
the variable powered ascent of the direct-ascent technique. Then, at a selected phase 
angle (or LM-to-CSM elevation angle), a direct intercept was to be initiated with a 
standard transfer angle of approximately 160". This maneuver w a s  referred to as 
terminal phase insertion (TPI). The time of TPI would vary as a function of the lift-off 
time, but the nominal launch window would be bounded so that the conditions for TPI 
would occur on the near side of the moon. The new advantages of the phasing-orbit 
technique were a standard final approach from a relative standpoint (not lighting), in- 
creased ground-support capability for the terminal phase, and the opportunity to make 
a plane change at a common node before the terminal phase. 
At this stage of development (early 1965), the following facts became evident. 
1. Standard lighting for the terminal phase was  important. Because the TPI 
time could vary considerably as a function of lift-off time within the nominal launch 
window for this technique, the lighting for the terminal phase could likewise vary. 
2. Standard, relatively slow rates before TPI would be advantageous to tracking 
and monitoring activities. This condition could be effected by a constant differential- 
height maneuver preceding TPI. 
3. To avoid visual loss of the target vehicle, the final braking would have to be 
performed by the RCS instead of by a major engine. The relative velocity and burn dura- 
tions for what w a s  then an approximately 70-nautical-mile Ah at TPI were larger than 
the RCS could accommodate operationally. 
Therefore, it was agreed that a technique should be developed that could afford 
standard lighting for  the terminal phase, that would involve a coelliptic- orbit condition 
before TPI, and that would provide acceptable braking rates for either the LM RCS o r  
the service module (SM) RCS. 
Original (three-impulse) coelliptic sequence: For the original three-impulse 
coelliptic-sequence technique, the apolune of the insertion orbit varied as a function of 
lift-off time within the nominal launch window. One-half revolution after insertion, a 
coelliptic maneuver was performed that essentially established a coelliptic or  constant 
Ah. The variation in the insertion orbit and, therefore, the variation in the Ah at the 
coelliptic maneuver theoretically would cause the desired conditions for TPI to occur at 
a fixed t ime regardless of lift-off time within the nominal launch window. The launch 
window was limited s o  that it began when the resulting coelliptic Ah was 15 nautical 
miles and ended when the coelliptic Ah increased to 50 nautical miles. The 50-nautical- 
mile Ah coincided with an insertion apolune of 30 nautical miles (the CSM being at  
80 nautical miles), which had been designated as the lowest safe insertion orbit for 
which to  target. The braking associated with a 50-nautical-mile Ah was  then considered 
acceptable for the RCS systems. 
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1 However, detailed dispersion analyses (late 1965 to mid-1966) showed that in- 
sertion dispersions could result in large slips in  the TPI time for the three-impulse 
coelliptic technique. No means existed for absorbing insertion dispersions before the 
terminal phase. Also, the variable insertion orbit was thought to involve complex 
monitoring techniques. Therefore, a technique was needed for which predictable in- 
sertion dispersions could be absorbed before the terminal phase and fo r  which a stand- 
a r d  or very nearly standard insertion orbit was applicable. An additional maneuver 
was needed that could be performed from a standard insertion orbit and that, in com- 
bination with the coelliptic maneuver, could adjust for dispersions. In an attempt to 
provide the additional necessary techniques and maneuvers, the coelliptic- sequence 
initiation (CSI)/constant- differential- height (CDH) coelliptic sequence was developed. 
~ 
Original (four-impulse) CSI/CDH coelliptic sequence: The original CSI/CDH co- 
elliptic sequence included the following characteristics. 
1. A standard insertion orbit of 30 by 10 nautical miles (insertion at perigee) 
2. The CSI maneuver at 30 minutes after insertion 
3. The CDH (coelliptic) maneuver at the resulting apolune after CSI 
4. The TPI approximately over the landing site 
5. The terminal-phase CSM travel angle of 140" 
The CSI AV direction was constrained to the horizontal to ensure no lowering of 
the perilune for a posigrade maneuver. The Ah at CDH varied from approximately 
15  to 50 nautical miles and the difference in  time (At), between CSI and CDH, varied 
from approximately 51 to 28 minutes for the variation in lift-off time within the nom- 
inal launch window. By adjusting the catchup rate  (that is, by varying the upcoming 
coelliptic Ah), the CSI allowed not only for the nominal launch window but also for the 
absorption of insertion dispersions. Performing the CDH at the apolune afforded opti- 
mum AV usage. Because the CSM orbit was  nearly circular, the CDH was always a 
near- horizontal maneuver. 
The new advantages of the CSI/CDH coelliptic sequence were the following. 
1. Better control of the TPI time slippage (as the CSI maneuver made this situa- 
tion less  sensitive to insertion dispersion) 
2. Use of backup charts to derive solutions because of the generally more stand- 
ard ranges and rates  
3.  Decrease in complexity because of the standard conditions around insertion 
At this stage of development (early 1967), the rendezvous profile became es- 
sentially standard in relation to the landing s i te  (or lighting). For the original three- 
impulse coelliptic sequence, the TPI had been scheduled at a fixed longitude (for 
example, 30' E) regardless of the landing-site longitude. The emphasis on ground 
tracking assistance was changed from post-TPI to Pre-TPI as it was realized that the 
pre-TPI assistance would be of the most value. Detailed analysis concerning the 
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terminal phase showed that the most favorable TPI lighting (TPI at 20 minutes before 
darkness) and the most favorable terminal-phase CSM travel angle (130" ) were not 
being used; therefore these optimum values were incorporated. An explanation of the 
changes is included la ter  in the report. 
A s  the hardware characteristics became more clearly defined and as the planning 
became more operationally oriented (early 1968), the RCS (that of the LM and, for the 
rescue sequence, that of the SM) was found to  contain insufficient acceleration capability 
to perform rendezvous for the larger  differential heights associated with the nominal 
launch window. Furthermore, a significantly higher apolune insertion orbit was  not 
advisable because of a diminishing APS propellant margin. Also, for  certain disper- 
sions, the rendezvous- radar  range limit (400 nautical miles) would be exceeded during 
the early part  of the rendezvous. The solution for these problems was a lower CSM 
parking orbit; therefore, the planned parking orbit w a s  decreased from 80 to 60 nauti- 
cal miles. The lowering of the CSM orbit yielded smaller relative ranges and de- 
creased the nominal LM RCS requirement. In addition, it decreased the requirements 
for the descent propulsion system for the landing phase and for the APS from an LM 
abort standpoint. The associated elimination of the requirement for the nominal 
(4- to 5-minute) launch window essentially bounded the acceptable coelliptic Ah to less 
than approximately 25 nautical miles (allowing predictable dispersions) and, therefore, 
alleviated the RCS problems of both the LM and SM. Because the Ah variation w a s  
small, the CSI-to-TPI time line became more standardized. Otherwise, the time line 
and maneuver logic remained essentially unchanged. 
However, as the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC), formerly the 
Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), began to develop the detailed procedures for the ren- 
dezvous time line (mid-1 968), the insertion- to-CSI and CSI-to-CDH time differences were 
found to be too short. A plane-change capability somewhere between insertion and TPI 
w a s  also necessary to avoid possible large out-of-plane maneuvers during the terminal 
phase. 
Extended CSI/CDH coelliptic sequence: The extended four-impulse CSI/CDH co- 
elliptic sequence mainly involved increases in  the A t  between maneuvers and a forced 
new nominal lighting requirement for TPI. This extended sequence resulted in the 
following changes. 
1. The insertion-to-CSI A t  w a s  increased to 50 minutes. 
2. The A t  between CSI and CDH nominally resulted in an increase to approxi- 
mately 50 minutes. 
3. The initiation of a nominally zero plane change was scheduled for  a separate 
plane-change maneuver (PC) at 90" (approximately 29 minutes) before CDH, and the 
plane change was to be completed in  conjunction with CDH. 
4. The TPI lighting was necessarily delayed (to the midpoint of darkness) because 
CDH now was scheduled only a few minutes before the previous TPI time. Although this 
new TPI lighting was not totally optimum, it was considered to be a reasonable trade- 
off for  the extended time line. 
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The longer insertion-to-CSI A t  afforded a more accurate CSI because platform 
alinement and additional tracking then could be performed before CSI. The platform 
alinement was originally scheduled after CSI. The pre-terminal-phase plane-change 
capability could result in a nearly coplanar terminal phase even when out-of-plane 
dispersions existed at insertion. 
Further dispersion analyses in late 1968 disclosed that the A t  between CSI and 
CDH could decrease sharply for certain dispersions when CDH w a s  performed at the 
first apsis after CSI, which had been the maneuver logic to this time. Furthermore, 
a plane-change completion at CDH could result in a AV vector that was primarily out 
of plane, and such a maneuver would be especially costly as compared with combining 
either the initiation o r  completion of the plane change with a sizable in-plane maneuver. 
To standardize the time line between CSI and CDH regardless of dispersions, the 
option to perform CDH one-half period af ter  CSI (instead of at the first apsis after CSI) 
was incorporated into the planning. Then, to avoid a relatively large radial AV at CDH, 
CSI was scheduled at the apolune of the 30- by 10-nautical-mile insertion orbit (55 min- 
utes  after insertion). The plane change was initiated in conjunction with CSI and com- 
pleted at PC, because this procedure was more economical than the PC/CDH plane 
change. When a sizable plane change was required, the CSI AV normally was signifi- 
cantly larger than that for CDH. 
A s  the crew began rendezvous simulations, the relative range at the beginning of 
the desired very-high-frequency (VHF)-ranging tracking period before CSI was found 
to be outside the VHF-ranging limit. In addition, the nominal 33-minute A t  between 
CDH and TPI w a s  approximately 5 minutes shorter than desirable, considering possible 
early slippage caused by predictable navigation and maneuver dispersions. Terminal- 
phase initiation was performed when the nominal elevation angle occurred, instead of 
precisely at the pre-lift-off nominal time, and the time of occurrence of the nominal 
elevation angle could vary from the nominal TPI time because of dispersions. 
Final CSI/CDH coelliptic sequence: After two additional significant changes, the 
development of the four-impulse CSI/CDH coelliptic sequence, as flown for Apollo 11 
and 12, the first two lunar-landing missions, and as planned for Apollo 13, was com- 
plete. Insertion into the 45-nautical-mile apolune orbit corrected the VHF-tracking- 
range problem by decreasing the relative range at lift-off and did not increase the 
predictable dispersion situation. Nominally, then, CSI was performed at the desired 
coelliptic Ah of 1 5  nautical miles, and CDH was a very small maneuver (theoretically 
zero if the CSM orbit were perfectly circular and no previous dispersions existed). 
To increase the A t  between CDH and TPI by approximately 5 minutes without nom- 
inally delaying TPI, an upward radial component of approximately 30 fps was targeted 
for insertion. The A t  between insertion and apolune (and therefore CSI) was thereby 
decreased by approximately 5 minutes, as CSI was retained at apolune. Because the 
CSI-to-CDH At  was essentially fixed, the 5 minutes were added to the CDH-to-TPI At.  
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The CDH-to-TPI A t  was not adjusted sim- 
ply by delaying TPI because.at that time 
it was thought that a 5- to 6-minute delay 
in the nominal TPI lighting combined with 
a delay caused by predictable dispersions 
wuuld result in unacceptable final-approach 
lighting. An inertial sketch and maneuver- 
sequence data representing the final CSI/ 
CDH coelliptic-sequence technique are 
shown in figure 2. The final nominal CSI/ 
CDH coelliptic sequence afforded a high 
probability of achieving a standard termi- 
nal phase, from the standpoints of relative 
motion and lighting considerations, regard- 
less of the occurrence of predictable dis- 
persions. However, the most undesirable 
factor of the CSI/CDH coelliptical sequence 
was the relatively long duration from inser- 
tion to intercept. The nearly perfect pow- 
e red  ascents and rendezvous of Apollo 11 
/- CSM at 















and 12 significantly increased the-confi- ahom LM lift-off. 
dence in the hardware and systems perform- 
anc e. Therefor e,  serious consideration 
bApproximate operational braking total. 
was given to designing a technique that 
would significantly shorten the rendezvous 
while maintaining the standard (relatively 
low - rate) terminal phase. 
f igure 2. - Representative Phasing-orbit 
CSI/CDH coelliptic sequence technique. 
Short rendezvous technique. - The two-impulse short rendezvous technique was 
initially proposed and basically designed by the Apollo 15 crewmen, who began exper- 
imenting with it during simulations before Apollo 14. The technique was adopted for 
Apollo 14 mainly because it removed one revolution of approximately 2 hours duration 
from the rendezvous and, therefore, from the rendezvous day, which had lengthened 
(using the coelliptic sequence) to 23-1/2 hours. Although the Apollo 15 rendezvous day 
was not quite as long and the final activities were not quite as demanding, the short 
rendezvous w a s  incorporated because of its successful application on Apollo 14. 
The short  rendezvous technique involved a precisely timed insertion into the orbit 
for  which the nominal TPI offset conditions would result at the desired lighting position. 
The insertion-orbit apolune altitude was between 45 and 50 nautical miles, and the A t  
between insertion and TPI was between 38 and 45 -minutes. These parameters were a 
function of the lunar stay time and the exact CSM orbit for the particular mission. A s  
discussed previously, the nominal TPI lighting was  delayed several minutes to allow 
sufficient t ime between insertion and TPI. Furthermore, because the LM orbit before 
TPI vas not coelliptic with the CSM orbit, the TPI maneuver was not a line-of-sight 
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maneuver and was  large enough to be per- 
formed accurately by the APS. Because 
TPI was no longer a line-of-sight maneuver, 
it was performed at the pre-lift-off nom- 
inal (fixed) time regardless of predictable 
dispersions. The major portion of the 
predictable insertion dispersions could be 
absorbed by an RCS tweak maneuver, 
used in combination with TPI, performed 
2 to 3 minutes after insertion. Should 
unexpectedly large dispersions o r  sys- 
tems failures during the powered ascent 
render the short rendezvous unsafe, a 
bailout to a coelliptic sequence rendez- 
vous would be initiated at approximately 
5 minutes after insertion. In fact, a 
major factor i n  the adoption of the short 
rendezvous was the convenient bailout 
capability to the flight- tested coelliptic 
sequence. Should certain nonnominal 
situations occur before LM lift-off, the 
coelliptic-sequence rendezvous then 
would be flown from lift-off. An iner- 
tial sketch and maneuver- sequence data 
representing the short rendezvous tech- 
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Figure 3. - Representative short  
rendemous technique. 
Terminal Phase 
Early in rendezvous development, the major objective became a standard final 
approach that, regardless of predictable dispersions, would be within the capability of 
the RCS and could be controlled manually with reasonably standard techniques and pro- 
cedures. Some of the terminal-phase considerations and requirements changed as the 
basic rendezvous technique changed, but the ultimate objective, the standard final ap- 
proach, remained throughout. 
Standard approach. - The angular geometry and inertial line-of-sight rates for 
standard approach were designed to be constant o r  standard regardless of dispersions. 
The Ah requirements at TPI o r  the AV requirements could change but were expected 
not to vary more than 20 to 30 percent f rom the nominal values. The maintenance of 
standard angular geometry and nearly zero inertial line-of-sight rates allowed the 
final velocity match to be achieved by manually controlled braking maneuvers directed 
along the line of sight to the target vehicle. The braking maneuvers were based on 
range/range-rate gates and gradually decreased the relative velocity to zero. For  the 
nominal final approach, the LM crossed approximately 4 nautical miles below the CSM 
and then advanced approximately 1/2 nautical mile in front of the CSM as it matched 
the altitude of the CSM. 
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Central travel angle. - The target vehicle central travel angle Cp was selected as 
a trade-off between the in-plane AV situation and the possible out-of-plane AV situation. 
The AV-optimum Cp for  a totally in-plane situation would be nearly 180". However, 
when an out-of-plane angle existed, a nearly 180" Cp became very expensive. There- 
fore,  to ensure avoidance of a significant out-of-plane penalty, the Cp had to be at least 
30" to 40" l ess  than 180'. However, if the @ was shortened to less  than approximately 
120', the in-plane AV penalty again became large, and the terminal-phase time line 
was impacted seriously. The initial compromise for Cp was 140". However, when the 
inertial line-of-sight ra te  during the final approach was found to be nearer zero and, 
therefore, easier to control for a @ of 130", the 130" @ was incorporated. This 
@ has been flown for all Apollo rendezvous to date, including the coelliptic sequence 
and short  rendezvous. 
Differential height at TPI. - To avoid visual loss of the target vehicle, the RCS 
system would be required to perform the braking. Therefore, the nominal Ah at TPI 
was selected so that, for predictable dispersion, braking would remain within the RCS 
capability and would not become extremely difficult as a manual operation. This nomi- 
nal Ah value was se t  at 15 nautical miles, and the dispersion range on the Ah was ap- 
proximately *7 nautical miles. 
25 nautical miles, the braking would be hard to control with the RCS, especially that of 
the SM. If the Ah became less than 7 o r  8 nautical miles, the sensitivity to dispersions 
involving low closing rates increased rapidly. 
If the Ah became greater than approximately 22 to 
The TPI maneuver direction and timing. - Early in rendezvous development, it was 
decided to incorporate the Gemini-initiated line-of-sight thrusting TPI (that is, the di- 
rection of the AV vector was approximately along the line of sight to the target vehicle). 
This type of TPI, when applied from the coelliptic-orbit situation, was not only nearly 
optimum from a AV standpoint and afforded the desired angular geometry discussed pre- 
viously, but it also afforded a manual backup technique. If no computer solution was 
available, a AV proportional to the estimated Ah applied in the direction of the target 
vehicle wouId effect a near-intercept trajectory. When the short rendezvous technique 
was incorporated fo r  Apollo 14, the line-of-sight TPI was one of the trade-offs fo r  the 
quicker rendezvous. Because TPI now was performed with the LM in the elliptical in- 
sertion orbit, the TPI AV vector was not along the line of sight, but, because of a rela- 
tively large radially down AV component, the AV vector direction was below the forward 
horizontal. Moreover, because of the increased magnitude of the TPI burn (70 to 90 fps), 
the decision was made to use the APS for  execution of the burn. Previously, fo r  the 
coelliptic-sequence plan, no nominal plan existed for relighting the APS because the 
largest maneuver, which was CSI, was only 40 to 50 fps. 
For the coelliptic sequence, TPI was actually executed when the nominal angular 
geometry (elevation angle to the target vehicle) occurred and not necessarily at the pre- 
cise pre-lift-off nominal TPI time. Because of small  e r r o r s  in navigation o r  small  dis- 
persions in the intermediate phasing maneuvers, the occurrence of the nominal elevation 
angle could slip several  minutes either early or late from the nominal TPI time. By 
executing TPI  at the nominal elevation angle (nearly line-of-sight burn), the nominal 
angular geometry resulted throughout the terminal phase. However, when the switch 
to  the short  rendezvous technique was made and the line-of-sight TPI was discontinued 
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anyway, TPI always was performed at the pre-lift-off nominal TPI time. This fixed- 
time TPI increased the sensitivity to  dispersions of the final approach, but the approach 
limits for an acceptable final approach were broadened significantly. 
Lighting. - Initially, the lighting requirements for the terminal phase mainly in- 
volved TPI because the final braking occurred in darkness. The TPI was scheduled at 
approximately 20 minutes before darkness, a position which optimized pre- and post- 
TPI tracking. Braking in darkness was no problem because of the LM tracking light and 
two ranging devices, the rendezvous radar  on the LM and the VHF ranging on the CSM. 
Therefore, a triple failure would have had t o  occur before the braking in darkness would 
not be feasible. 
However, when the extended coelliptic sequence was incorporated, the nominal 
TPI  lighting was necessarily delayed. The second choice for TPI lighting was at or  near 
the midpoint of darkness, again because of tracking considerations. In addition, the 
lighting for  braking (now in sunlight) became a factor because, if the TPI slipped la ter  
than approximately 1 2  minutes, the LM crewmen would be forced to look directly 
into the sun during part of the final braking. The TPI o r  terminai-phase lighting became 
a compromise between acceptable tracking around TPI and avoidance of sun interference 
during braking. 
When the short rendezvous was incorporated, the TPI  lighting was delayed approx- 
imately 7 minutes to allow a more acceptable At between insertion and TPI. This delay 
was not critical to the braking lighting because of the associated fixed-time TPI. 
Midcourse corrections. - Terminal-phase nominally zero midcourse corrections 
were scheduled at  approximately one-third and two-thirds of the way from TPI  to 
braking. If a maneuver was required to  correct  the trajectory, the initial intercept 
position and time were targeted normally. If a major dispersion had caused the pre- 
dicted brakilig maneuvers to become unacceptably large, one of the midcourse maneu- 
ve r s  would be used to dela) the intercept and thus decrease the braking AV. This 
delaying technique was referred to as TP12. 
DEVELOPMENT OF L M  ABORT AND RESCUE PLAN 
From the beginning of the development of the abort and rescue plan, the primary 
emphasis w a s  on the powered descent and the period immediately after landing. These 
were considered the most probable phases in which an abort  could occur. Considerable 
planning also was devoted to failures associated with the LM-active Hohmann descent, 
to cases  of no-powered-descent initiation, and to correct-phasing LM ascents before 
o r  after the nominal lift-off revolution. Early program contingency planning also in- 
cluded LM lift-offs for any time (without correct  phasing) and in  time-critical situa- 
tions; however, because realistic single-failure cases  were not identified fo r  these 
situations, operational planning was limited. 
The oi-iginal abort and rescue maneuver zequences, beginning in 1964, were ex- 
tremely complex because of the limited onbaard capabilities. For  example, fo r  an abort 
occurring any time during powered descent, the LM was targeted f o r  a constant inser- 





varied fop each. For  early aborts, the LM final approach to the CSM was from above; 
for a later region, one-and-a-half revolutions were required between CSI and CDH in- 
below the CSM. Because of the complexity in the abort plan, the rescue plan was also 
complex. The CSM did not have the CSI/CDH logic on board, and the command module 
pilot had to depend either on the ground o r  on the mirror-image technique (that is, the 
method by which the CSM applies the LM-computed maneuver essentially in the opposite 
direction). The primary rescue technique for  bad-phasing situations was the six- 
impulse technique, whereby the CSM transferred to a 20-nautical-mile circular orbit 
by means of the first two maneuvers, and then adjusted the phasing, became coelliptic, 
and executed the terminal phase (theoretically, with two impulses) by means of the last 
four maneuvers. 
I 
I stead of the normal one-half revolution; and, for late aborts, the LM approached from 
l 
I In early 1968, analyses for the incorporation of several powered-descent-abort 
I insertion orbits (to vary as a function of abort time regions) were begun. This work 
evolved by late 1968 into the variable-targeting concept. According to this technique, 
the correct insertion orbit, that would result in an LM approach from a coelliptic Ah of 
15 nautical miles below the CSM, could be targeted for all abort times during the first 
10 minutes of powered descent. For an abort after 10 minutes, a constant 30-nautical- 
mile apolune insertion orbit w a s  targeted; however, an in-orbit phasing maneuver (de- 
rived by the use of onboard programs in conjunction with onboard charts) permitted the 
standard LM approach from below (although one additional revolution was required). 
dezvous) replaced this  phasing region for aborts occurring after 10 minutes. The 
variable-targeting concept originally was  thought not to be feasible because of the soft- 




I For Apollo 12, a second variable-targeting region (by means of a two-revolution ren- 
ware requirements involved; however, after a detailed analysis of the precise require- I 1 
The variable targeting led to simplification and standardization of the abort and 
rescue plan. The same basic technique now applied to almost a l l  LM-active cases. 
Therefore, the rescue techniques were standardized; for example, for a CSM-active 
terminal phase, the CSM would always approach the LM from above. 
By th is  time, the CSI/CDH logic had been placed on board the CSM, and an inde- 
pendent onboard rendezvous solution for the coelliptic sequence could be determined in 
the CSM. This technique greatly improved the CSM support of any rendezvous sequence 
using CSI/CDH logic. Spacecraft independence was emphasized because of the uncer- 
tainty in the lunar potential; therefore, nearly all rescue plans involved no more than 
one external (ground) maneuver. When correct phasing existed initially, no external 
maneuver was  required. The addition of VHF-ranging capability to the CSM c-nsured 
further independence and confidence. A s  indicated previously, the VHF- ranging addi- 
tion also affected the nominal development. 
The original rescue AV budgeting philosophy, which remained unchanged through 
Apollo 13, was to allow rescue within the normal LM (ascent stage) lifetime for all fea- 
sible rescue situations. However, to allocate a greater AV budget for nominal objec- 
tives, the rescue AV budget for Apollo 14 and subsequent missions had to be lowered, 
so that rescue for  certain possible situations required powering down the LM to a min- 
imum life-support condition. However, the rescue situations that would require such 
minimum power conditions were extremely improbable. 
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Beginning with Apollo 13, the abort and rescue plan changed somewhat because of 
the change to the nominal plan (landing one revolution later relative to the main LM/ 
CSM separation). However, the order of the occurrence of the regions (one-revolution 
o r  two-revolution rendezvous) was the only significant change. The basic techniques 
were the same. The final plan was not simple; but, compared with the plan approxi- 
mately a year before Apollo 11, the final plan was considerably simpler and also more 
standard. 
EVOLUTION OF APOLLO RENDEZVOUS DISPERSION PROGRAM 
REQU I REMENTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND ANALY S I S 
Rendezvous-Dispersion -Analysis Program Requirements 
From the beginning of the Apollo Program, dispersion analyses were essential for 
all phases of each Apollo mission, particularly for the rendezvous phase. The disper- 
sion analysis was required to aid in defining the nominal propellant budget, in establish- 
ing mission rules and crew procedures, in defining constraints, in selecting the 
maneuver sequence that would give the highest overall probability of success, and in 
verifying general ground and onboard programs. 
To develop a dispersion-analysis program, careful consideration must be given 
to establishing the detailed program requirements for the overall dispersion-analysis 
effort for any mission phase. These requirements come from many a reas  and require 
a reasonable amount of coordination. For the Apollo Program, most of these require- 
ments came from the support of mission-rules development, crew-procedures develop- 
ment, onboard-chart development, simulations, and propeliant budgeting. 
The rendezvous-dispersion-analysis program requirements for the Apollo Pro- 
gram were not outlined in the detail required for an efficient program development ef- 
fort. This was partially because of a lack of knowledge of program objectives and 
partially because of the manner in which the responsibility for this effort w a s  assigned. 
These two problems resulted in significant t ime and manpower losses.  
Rendezvous-Di sper sion-Anal ysi s Program Development 
In developing the rendezvous-dispersion-analysis program and in performing the 
analysis itself, numerous problems had to be resolved. One of the first important tasks 
in  developing a program of this t pe is to establish, in  the early development stages, 
is selected should be responsible for the detailed mission planning and the trajectory 
analysis for the particular mission phase because the dispersion analysis coincides 
with the mission planning and the trajectory analysis work and requires similar skills. 
the responsible organization for r he detailed dispersion analysis. The organization that 
In the Apollo Program, the responsibility was not initially assigned to the organ- 
ization responsible for the detailed mission planning but instead was assigned to the 
organization responsible for developing the onboard guidance. The latter organization 
possessed little understanding of the detailed rendezvous techniques and associated 
dispersion problems. A significant amount of manpower and time was lost in the 
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attempt to complete the required program development in an operationally timely man- 
ner. When the responsibility was reassigned to the organization doing the detailed 
mission planning and trajectory analysis, the situation improved, manpower expendi- 
tures  decreased, and, most important, the analysis was completed in a timely manner. 
Tlie main reason for this improvement was that, to perform a detailed dispersion 
analysis on a mission phase, a knowledge of the detailed mission-planning aspects and 
the trajectory analysis of the phase was more essential than a detailed knowledge of 
the guidance and control mathematics and systems. 
Official data transfer between organizations should be restricted mainly to the 
type of data that does not change with every minor mission change o r  procedures 
change. This type of data should be generated internally in the program, if possible, 
and detailed verification checks should be made on these data, as required, with the 
organization o r  organizations responsible for the data. In this way, mission and pro- 
cedure changes receive a timely response. Otherwise, interfaces tend to delay the 
completion of the analysis. 
Careful consideration should be given to the construction of models in the pro- 
gram. Complicated modeling should be used only when necessary, especially when 
simple models, which usually a r e  acceptable from an operational standpoint, will suf- 
fice. This modeling problem usually can be resolved by consulting the groups or or- 
ganizations that have the technical skill in  these areas. Consideration also should be 
given to the operational accuracy requirements of the data; for example, eight-digit 
accuracy is needless when two- o r  four-digit accuracy is acceptable. 
Program inputs must be kept simple and logical, so  that the engineer running the 
program can make expedient changes to the program input without the assistance of a 
programer.  Apollo experience also was indicative that covariance matrices are highly 
effective for those a reas  in which minor mission o r  procedure changes do not change 
the basic dispersion. Covariance matrices a re  especially useful in the transfer from 
one mission phase to another. 
The actual program should be developed by personnel who a r e  knowledgeable in 
the particular mission phase that is to be considered. The basic program should be 
flexible, and the use of engineering simulations of both the onboard targeting and the 
navigation and ground targeting programs should be detailed. This process saves con- 
siderable program-development and verification time because the accuracy with which 
the onboard and ground programs have been simulated is always a concern. If short- 
cuts are taken, some important area can be missed, and the correction of the oversight 
can be time consuming. Apollo experience also proved that solving problems by known 
"brute force" methods, even if they involve significant additional machine time, is 
better than attempting to use untried sophisticated methods. When a tight schedule is 
involved, untried techniques are especially inappropriate because development of these 
techniques generally involves the expenditure of much money and engineering time, and 
the techniques still have to be verified by a detailed simulation. Detailed documentation 
on the program should be kept current. The program also should be programed in a 
programing language that can be easily understood and changed by either programers 
o r  engineers. 
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To perform the Apollo dispersion analysis, programs were developed that included 
engineering simulations of specific spacecraft, Real Time Computer Complex (RTCC) 
rendezvous targeting and navigation programs, and various systems models. These 
models included the engine guidance systems, spacecraft accelerometers, spacecraft 
platform, rendezvous radar, sextant, and VHF tracking. All major e r r o r  sources 
associated with each model in te rms  of drift, bias, and noise were included. From the 
start of Apollo 7 to Apollo 11, four different program development efforts were under- 
taken for  various reasons, which resulted in the existence of two operational rendezvous- 
dispersion-analysis programs by Apollo 9. One program, the lunar ascent and 
rendezvous program, which was  being developed by a support contractor, was dropped 
before Apollo 7, and the in-house program developed to replace it became the prime 
operational program. The other operational program, a general Apollo dispersion- 
analysis program, was  developed on the same support contract and actually underwent 
two different development stages, each of which was considered as a different program 
development. Parts of the general Apollo dispersion-analysis program were dropped 
after Apollo 7, but some par ts  of that program-development effort were used to develop 
the remaining contractor operational program. The two operational programs were 
necessary to cross-check the data obtained from each program. This process proved 
highly beneficial in verifying the operational data and improved the overall probability 
of mission success. 
By the Apollo 11 mission, the nominal rendezvous dispersion analysis w a s  per- 
formed similarly in both the in-house and contractor programs. However, the prime 
in-house program was  more versatile and could perform dispersion analysis on any 
rendezvous profile that the onboard o r  RTCC systems could fly. The contractor pro- 
gram basically was designed around the nominal mission profile and was developed by 
an independent source. Therefore, the e r r o r  model in the contractor's program was 
not identical to the e r r o r  model in the in-house program. 
The dispersion-analysis program development evolved from the mission planning 
for each rendezvous mission, with the contractor program following the nominal devel- 
opment, and the in-house program following both the nominal mission planning and the 
LM abort and rescue planning. The in-house dispersion-analysis program ultimately 
acquired capabilities that were necessary to keep pace with and support the mission- 
planning effort. Therefore, the in-house program became the prime tool for dispersion 
analysis. 
Performance of Rendezvous Dispersion Analysis 
In performing the dispersion analysis on each development mission preceding the 
lunar landing mission, different e r r o r  sources and inputs had to  be considered for each 
mission. Obviously, Apollo 11 had the most complex set  of e r r o r  sources and inputs. 
On Apollo 7, only one maneuver source (RTCC maneuver solution) up to TPJ and two 


















solution) for TPI were used. A s  many as four computer-maneuver sources (RTCC, 
command module computer, LM guidance computer, and LM auxiliary guidance sys- 
tem) for specific maneuvers were used on Apollo 11. 
Initially, the RTCC, with the aid of ground tracking from the NASA Manned Spac 
Flight Network (MSFN), was considered to have the most relialjle maneuver solution, 
especially for  the earth-orbit missions. Therefore, it was used as the standard with 
which to compare the other solutions and was executed if the other solution o r  solutions 
did not compare within a given tolerance. However, for the lunar-orbit missions, the 
MSFN could not track the spacecraft and determine their orbits for  the rendezvous com- 
putation as well as it had been able to track them in earth orbit. Thus, the spacecraft 
onboard navigation and maneuver computation became the prime source for  the 
rendezvous-maneuver solutions. With the change in the RTCC accuracy of the 
maneuver-solution sources w a s  a high degree of confidence in the onboard systems that 
had been obtained during the earth-orbital development flights. Therefore, the 
rendezvous-maneuver solutions went from basically RTCC control on Apollo 7 to  space- 
craft onboard control on Apollo 11 and subsequent flights. During the rendezvous devel- 
opment phase, the dispersion analysis also was used to assist in establishing the 
onboard navigation schedules and to establish and verify onboard procedures, crew time 
lines, and mission rules. 
Apollo Program experience has emphasized the need throughout mission planning 
for  dispersion-analysis information. Therefore, an effort to provide dispersion- 
analysis information and support from the conception stage of the mission to the actual. 
flight must be made. The level of detail will vary throughout mission planning, with 
the most detailed and complex work being done on the operational trajectory. This 
work must be started early in the mission-planning stage so that timely inputs to the 
planning effort are possible and trajectory and procedure changes are minimized. 
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
Organ izat ional Contributions 
The development of acceptable rendezvous techniques was the result  of direction, 
coordination, analyses, and inputs f rom several areas. Most of the trajectory design 
and analysis was performed by mission-planning specialists at the Manned Spacecraft 
Center. During the planning of the Gemini rendezvous missions, several  of the astro- 
nauts becztme actively involved in the rendezvous planning, and their ideas contributed 
significantly to  the initial development of the coelliptic sequence. As the Gemini Pro- 
gram neared completion, several  specialists familiar with Gemini procedures became 
involved in Apollo design work and made valuable contributions. 
The original official centerwide interface involving the rendezvous development 
was accomplished by the Flight Operations Panel. This panel was responsible for the 
coordination of the constraints and requirements involved in the Apollo mission planning. 
Later,  the development of the detailed techniques was coordinated through the data- 
priority meetings. 
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Some of the most important inputs during the year before Apollo 11 came from 
areas directly involved with the crew procedures, training, and simulations. Many in- 
dividuals from the flight-crew, flight-control, and guidance and control areas contrib- 
uted significantly to the design of the Apollo rendezvous techniques. 
As the first lunar-landing mission approached, an increasing number of people 
began working on the planning effort, and the hardware and software constraints and 
capabilities were defined concretely. As a result, the rendezvous planning became 
more detailed and precise. Although several  minor changes were made to the tech- 
niques, no major changes to the nominal or contingency rendezvous plans occurred 
during the last  6 months before Apollo 11. Furthermore, the only subsequent major 
change to the basic techniques w a s  the change to the quicker short rendezvous technique 
for the Apollo 14 and 15 nominal plans. 
Organizational factors and developments for  the dispersion-analysis development 
have been discussed previously. The most significant organizational development in 
this a rea  was the decision to give the responsibility and control of the rendezvous dis- 
persion analysis to the rendezvous specialists. 
Contr ibut ions f r o m  Fl ight  Experience 
As the Gemini rendezvous flights were flown, considerable information was intro- 
duced into the Apollo rendezvous planning, especially in relation to the terminal phase. 
The actual flight rehearsals of the coelliptic sequence during Apollo 9 and 10 contrib- 
uted valuable data. Although a coelliptic rendezvous had been flown in the Gemini Pro- 
gram, the LM hardware and software were tested in actual flight for the first time on 
Apollo 9. The LM was positioned away from (above and behind) the CSM so that, be- 
ginning at CDH, the relative motion and various relative rates were essentially those 
planned for  the lunar-landing-mission rendezvous. 
The Apollo 10 rendezvous, a portion of the first LM performance in lunar orbit, 
actually included a relative-motion profile that was an almost exact model of the lunar- 
landing- mission rendezvous beginning at insertion. Although the LM was  considerably 
heavier during the Apollo 10 rendezvous than during the lunar-landing mission and 
therefore the burn durations and handling qualities were different, the information and 
confidence gained were extremely valuable. The experience gained on Apollo 10 re-  
garding flight-control interface and the development of the LM abort and rescue plan 
considerably simplified the corresponding Apollo 11 situations. Other valuable informa- 
tion came from the operation of the LM and CSM navigational systems in the uncertain 
lunar potential. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR RENDEZVOUS PLANNING FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS 
For the Apollo lunar-landing missions, the change of the nominal rendezvous 
plan from the direct-ascent rendezvous technique to  a four-impulse phasing-orbit (co- 
elliptic sequence) technique was necessary to ensure a standard, manually executable 
terminal approach. After the f i r s t  two lunar landing missions, the change to .the two- 
impulse short rendezvous technique occurred because of the significantly increased 
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confidence in the systems and procedures resulting from actual lunar flight experience 
and because of the availability for a fallback to the familiar coelliptic sequence for con- 
tingency situations. 
Some of the most important factors affecting the total rendezvous-plan evolution 
.were the implementation of the variable targeting for powered-descent aborts in the 
lunar module descent program, the implementation of the coelliptic-rendezvous maneu- 
ver  sequence in both the lunar module backup guidance system and the command and 
service module primary guidance system, and the implementation of the very-high- 
frequency ranging on board the command module. 
Several problems had to  be corrected t o  assure a successful rendezvous disper- 
sion and trajectory analysis, These problems included the lack of precisely defined re- 
quirements f o r  the overall analysis, the lack of proper interfaces with other responsible 
organizations, the lack of computer-program flexibility and documentation, and the ini- 
tial assignment of the dispersion-analysis responsibility to an organization not posses- 
sing rendezvous skill. 
The following recommendations are divided into the main a reas  of consideration 
discussed in the body of the report. Most of the recommendations should apply to ren- 
dezvous in almost any situation, whereas a few of the recommendations would apply 
only for  rendezvous conditions similar to those in lunar orbit. 
Nominal Launch Window 
The recommendations that apply to  a nominal launch window relative to a surface 
vehicle and a n  orbiting target vehicle are as follows. 
1. If the target vehicle has  the capability of performing a plane change and a 
phase change to make its orbit nearly coplanar with the surface vehicle when the opti- 
mum lift-off phasing exists, a launch window of only a few seconds is adequate for 
nominal considerations. Changes in lift-off revolution can also be handled by the plane/ 
phase change capability. 
2. A planar situation should be planned that will allow a revolution-late lift-off 
without an additional target-vehicle plane change and with a minimal plahe change for  
the ascending surface vehicle. 
Base Orbits 
The recommendations that apply to the design of base orbits are as follows. 
1. The target-vehicle parking orbit should be based on both nominal and abort 
situations, considering ranging and incremental-velocity capabilities of both the target 
vehicle and the surface vehicle. 
2. If not prohibited by other considerations, a circular target orbit should be 
applied because of the simplification in rendezvous software and procedures. 
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Maneuver S eq ue nce 
Maneuver sequence in general. - The recommendations that apply to the maneuver 
sequence in general (that is, nominal o r  abort and rescue) a r e  as follows. 
1. Dispersion-absorption and phasing capabilities should exist that will allow a 
standard terminal phase, especially if the final approach is to be manually controlled. 
These capabilities may be as simple as a two-impulse tweak sequence if the initial sit- 
uation is nearly nominal; however, if large dispersions o r  nonnominal phasing initially 
.exists, the capabilities should involve several maneuvers at approximately half- 
revolution increments to avoid excessive propellant usage. The coelliptic-sequence 
rendezvous should be a prime candidate for this latter situation. 
2. There should be adequate time between maneuvers to allow for required track- 
ing, alinements, and maneuver preparation. 
3. The difference in time between a given pair of maneuvers should be as con- 
stant as practical to allow standardization of procedures. 
4. When elliptical orbits are involved, maneuvers should be near the line of 
apsides to optimize incremental-velocity usage. 
5. The initial in-orbit maneuvers for the ascending surface vehicle should be de- 
signed not to lower the insertion-orbit perigee. 
6. The sequence should be designed so that as much of the maneuver sequence 
as possible is within vehicle-to-vehicle tracking capability. 
Nominal ascent-rendezvous-maneuver sequence. - The recommendations that 
apply specifically to the nominal ascent-rendezvous-maneuver sequence are as follows. 
1. A sequence that is as short as practical but allows a reasonable dispersion- 
absorption capability and a nearly standard terminal phase should be applied, especially 
if the incremental-velocity situation is tight and the final approach is to  be manually 
controlled. 
2. The nominal sequence should allow for a convenient switch to a contingency 
sequence if large dispersions o r  certain failures occur. 
3. The nominal sequence should be designed to allow backup ground support when 
practical. 
Abort and rescue maneuver sequences. - The recommendations that apply specif- 
ically to the abort and rescue planning are as follows. 
1. The plan should involve as much standardization as possible, and the sequences 
should be as similar as possible to the nominal. 
2. From a relative standpoint, the terminal phase should be nearly identical to 
the nominal (for example, the ascending vehicle always approaching from below). 
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3. . Onboard independence should be stressed by designing the sequences to  make 
full use  of onboard software (with minimum use of ground-derived maneuvers). 
4. The sequences also should be designed to afford use of relatively uncompli- 
cated backup charts. 
5. Software that involves insertion into the correct  phasing orbit for  an abort 
back to  orbit anywhere during the powered descent should be implemented because it 
affords simplification and standardization. 
Terminal Phase 
The recommendations that apply specifically to a terminal phase that is man- 
ually controlled and executed with a small  reaction control system type of propulsion 
are as follows. 
1. The approach should be standard from En angular-geometry stzindpoint, and 
the various rates should not vary significantly from those of the nominal case. These 
rates should be large enough to allow crew determination of and reaction to the closing 
situation but not so large as to make the braking maneuvers extremely difficult using 
the relatively small  propulsion system. 
2. The thruster orientation should allow continuous visual contact between vehi- 
c les  during the final approach. 
3. Although precise lighting is not critical, the final approach should be designed 
so that the crewmen of the vehicle approaching from below a r e  not required to  look 
within approximately 30" of the sun while maintaining visual contact with the other 
vehicle. 
4. The terminal phase should be nearly coplanar to allow the simplest final brak- 
ing procedures. This situation should be afforded by designing an in-orbit plane-change 
capability before the terminal phase. 
5. The terminal-phase-initiation maneuver with the incremental-velocity direc- 
tion along the line of sight to the target vehicle should receive prime consideration if .  
a coelliptic phase is applied, because it allows standard angular geometry throughout 
the terminal phase and affords a convenient manual backup technique for the initiation 
maneuver. 
6. The type of braking, in which the main maneuvering is along the line of sight 
to the target vehicle while the inertial line-of-sight rate is maintained near zero  should 
receive pr ime consideration fo r  a manually controlled final approach. 
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Dispersion A n  a I y s i s 
The recommendations relative to  the development of the dispersion analysis and 
the associated computer program are as follows. 
1. Dispersion analysis should be involved in the planning as early as possible. 
2. Detailed requirements for the dispersion-analysis program and overall analy- 
sis should be determined early. . 
3. Proper interfaces with other responsible organizations should exist. 
4. Computer-program flexibility and adequate documentation should exist. 
5. Responsibility for and control of the rendezvous dispersion analysis should be 
assigned to the mission planning rendezvous experts. 
Ge n e ra I D eve I op rn e n t and 0 rga n izat i on  a I C on s i de rat  i on s 
Some recommendations generally relating to the development of the maneuver 
plan and organizational considerations a r e  as follows. 
1. Required interfaces with all disciplines and cooperating organizations should 
occur as early and as often as practical. Such interfaces definitely should involve, in 
addition to the interfaces with the other mission planning areas, such areas as flight 
control, flight software, flight crew, f light-crew support, guidance and control, and 
other areas representing the hardware and science disciplines, The project offices 
and various panels should organize and centralize these interfaces, but informal 
working-level interfaces should be permitted. 
2. Onboard independence should be stressed in software and hardware design. 
3. Ground-based backup for all maneuvers and procedures is desirable but 
should not necessarily be a dominant factor if adequate onboard autonomy exists. 
4. Mission simulations in the control center involving the crew, flight control- 
l e rs ,  and support personnel should simulate the various mission phases and involve as 
many of the potential contingency situations as possible within reasonable manpower 
requirements. 
5. Actual flight rehearsals testing the hardware and software should be per- 
formed i f  practical. 
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